BackupHDDVD, a tool to decrypt AACS protected movies

[Syris2k4]

The process to update Title Key File is as follows:
1. Decrypt all the Title Key(s)
2. Modify Title Key File
3. Update Title Key File Generation and Title Key File Nonce
Update Title Key File Generation to increment the value by 1 and regenerate three Title Key File Nonces
4. Re-encrypt all the Title Key(s) and store TKF_X

Are you talking about that? or is the lack of sleep completely raping my ability to read your "hint"?

[DanITman]

Awwww No

Things just got a bit more difficult


Warner Bros., which helped popularize the DVD more than a decade ago, plans to announce next week a single videodisc that can play films and television programs in both Blu-ray and HD DVD, the rival DVD technologies.


http://news.com.com/New+disc+may+sway+DVD+wars/2100-1041_3-6147053.html

I must admit I've followed this thread since seeing info
posted on a news site.

Even on New Years eve I was on the phone with a colleague
about it.

Time for me to "Re-Generate" for a bit
I'd think the "KEY" to this is in the AACS Documentation
Read, Read and then Re-Read it.

Thats what I recomend, time to "RE-GENERATE"

I think what they are refering to (I may be wrong) is a dual sided disc. On one side you will have an HD-DVD image and on the other a Blu-Ray image.

[tonyp12]

I think what they are refering to (I may be wrong) is a dual sided disc. On one side you will have an HD-DVD image and on the other a Blu-Ray image.

I would say so too.
And I hate when you have no logo on disc, it's so hard to read that tiny hub what movie title it's and what side goes up.

That the problem with 16:9 and 4:3 dual sided DVD now.

[Gradius]

I read that on news:

"But still, the hack can be blocked by adding different keys on every disk. Currently, the mastering houses use different keys for each movie title (title-specific security code). The Blu-Ray Association could partially have an answer to this, at least by preventing the replication of the Blu-Ray content on blank BD media. They have included the so-called "ROM-Mark" as an extra security feature on blank Blu-Ray discs. The ROM-Mark was designed to prevent the casual copying from BD-ROM to recordable media. It is an analog level mechanism for bit-by-bit copy protection. The ROM-Mark requires special machinery in the disc mastering process in order to be inserted on disc and thus, it could prevent malicious replications.

Reading these thoughts, someone might claim that the Blu-Ray camp could have some benefits over the rival HD DVD. We await the official response to these claims from Toshiba and Sony with great interest."

About Sony/BD with that ROM-Mark begin analog is pure BS, everyone with good ASM knowledge can hack the firmware on drive to ignore that mark forever.

[JVz]

When is 1.0 coming out?

[CoZZm0]

It already is. But you still need to find out how to get the keys yourself.

[christopherw]

This place reserved for future words of wisdom


I do hope that this turns out to be verifiably functional though, I'm all for HDDVD over BD (for a variety of reasons, we all have them) and if it became possible to strip out the restrictions so I could watch them over DVI on my nice Bravia from my PC, I think I'd buy even more discs than I would otherwise!

...Yeah, I already own HD-DVDs of some of my favourite films, and I don't even own an HD-DVD player yet! Talk about nutter. X360 drive on the way a little later this year. :D

[cyber1]

I dont understand people who thinks this is a hoax just because he did not release any keys, if he released the software with keys he would break the law.

I have been in contact with another person who has found the key also...

Since I dont have any Xbox HD-DVD I cant confirm this.

[AndreLi]

Its finally happened - Who yaaaa - I read a article on CDRInfo about it.
Kick A#$

[CoZZm0]

Its finally happened - Who yaaaa - I read a article on CDRInfo about it.
Kick A#$

Nothing to see or its already been removed if posted in the forums. I guess what will happen now is as "proof" for this is posted, it will be cleansed from forums etc just as quickly to ensure that there are no legal ramafactions for the hosting sites.

[tjf]

Is this http://www.hardforum.com/showpost.php?p=1030429406&postcount=56 the only public confirmation?

[feizex]

Hi Guys,

Finally I can post! 5 days is a long time. ;)

I have been following this mostly out of curiosity.

Here's some speculation...

Enjoy!
FEIZEX.

Personally, reading the FAQ makes it sound convincing - what con artist would think up bugs for their fake solution like the following extract which says that a fast forward function doesn't work??? If it is fake then this is more clever than actually having found the keys - what a psycho!

"What are the side effects of the "Nav chain" bug fix? You cannot do fast forward, or backward using the round dial, but you can still use the progress bar to navigate through the film. So it’s not that bad. For some reason, the sub-titles don’t seems to work anymore. It may be a side effect of the nav chain bug. But may be not."

And just like every other engineer he can't help but add bells and whistles...
"I want to go further in the decryption, so I decide to track down the "Volume unique key" instead of title key. I found it also! I'm preparing BackupHDDVD V1.00, that will support volume key and title keys."

And then...
"What's new in this version?

- Volume key support
- Partial resume of an interrupted decryption session
- New file format and file name for key database file."

Seriously folks why the &*(%# would you bother adding a resume function if you knew that noone was going to use it???

Oh and all you who say he's done nothing. Well that's not true. He did what he claimed. He wrote a decrypter. It's useless you say - the AACS spec is public - anyone could write the program, the problem is we don't have the keys. EXACTLY. This is his way of saying - you're not pinning anything on me. His last word on this "BackupHDDVD is a proof of concept."

Seriously he can't be the only person in the world smart enough to figure it out. He's given enough clues.

He has however made one contradiction...
"I did not break AACS"
and then in the same post...
"Did I break AACS? I don't know."

What a glaring error - he must be a fake! :P


BTW, all you that think it is definitely PowerDVD 6.5 remember he did mention he owned another...
"But when I realized the 2 software players on windows don't allowed me to play the movie at all" - Muslix64


Once you find a way to get the keys, the next step would be to bypass the revocation mechanism. It could be as easy as swapping greater than for less than on the revocation list version number comparison mechanism (if you can find it) so that it keeps the first one it sees and no others...

Extract from spec AACS spec:
"The drive shall keep the highest-version-number Host Revocation List Record it has seen. (The version number is found in the previous Type and Version Record.) During authentication, the drive shall check that the Host ID in the Host Certificate is not in its host revocation list. These first two records combined together, i.e. the Type and Version Record followed by the Host Revocation List Record, are also referred to as a Partial Media Key Block or Partial MKB for the purpose of storing the HRL in the drive."

http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/specs091/AACS_Spec_Common_0.91.pdf
page 30


There have been questions over what the Flash on the disk does. Well here is one clue...
"4.8 Updating Host Revocation List in Non-volatile Memory of Drive ..........................................39"


There is still confusion surrounding the Volume Unique Key, Volume Variant Unique Key (Kvvu), the Volume Identifier and the Title Key.

So far as I can tell, the Volume Variant Unique Key (Kvvu) is different to the Volume Unique Key (Kvu).

We don't care about the variant key. Maybe someone else can confirm this?

Info comes from: Advanced Access Content System: HD DVD and DVD Pre-recorded Book
http://www.aacsla.com/specifications/AACS_Spec_HD_DVD_and_DVD_Prerecorded_0_912.pdf

Here's what can be done with the Volume Unique Key (Kvu)...

3.4 Title Key File
An AACS Disc shall have at least one Title Key File (TKF) in which each Title Key data is encrypted by AES-128E with Ku. Ku is the Volume Unique Key (Kvu). Title Key Files on an AACS Disc shall reside in the “AACS” directory.

This is also not to be confused with the Volume Identifier...
"2.3.3 Volume Identifier
Each side of an AACS-Protected HD DVD-Video ROM medium shall contain one and only one Volume Identifier (IDvolume) of 128 bits."

The docco adds confusion when it says...
"Each Title Key can be decrypted using the Volume ID" - true, but you need the media key as well...

If you have the media key Km and IDvolume you can calculate the Volume Unique Key Kvu which is what you really need to decrypt the title key.

"A Encrypted Title Key of 16 bytes which is encrypted as follows: Kte_i = AES-128E(Kvu,Kt_i), where AES-128E denotes encryption by the AES algorithm in the ECB mode defined in the AACS Introduction and Common Cryptographic Elements, Kt_i is a Title Key and Kvu is the Volume Unique Key defined in the AACS Pre-recorded Video Book."


And for those that still have doubts about the decrypted key being stored in memory, RTFM...

"A Player may also retain the decrypted Title Keys while playback continues. The decrypted Title
Keys shall be, however, discarded if one of the following conditions holds:
1. The Disc is ejected.
2. The Player loses power.
3. The Player goes into Stop State.
4. The boot sequence for an AACS Disc starts.
a) The boot sequence is described in 6.2.2.2.
A Permission for playback itself is in fact a TKF which resides on a Disc, in a Persistent Storage or
in the File Cache in a Player. Only a Title Key which is bound to a TN is for an Instant Permission because
the TN in the AACS module to which the Title Key is bound is discarded once the Binding MAC is resolved.
In this context, a Binding MAC for TN, where BIND_TYPE = 100b, shall be verified every time the
corresponding Title Key is used. Note that a Permission associated with a Title Key with other binding is
considered to be “Basic” or “Cacheable”."

[zacoz]

Is this http://www.hardforum.com/showpost.php?p=1030429406&postcount=56 the only public confirmation?
Edit: Ignore post - must be too tired - can't see for looking :lol:

This hardly seems confirmation to me. The "progress" screenshot posted shortly thereafter by w1retap shows BackupHDDVD running without the keys. Seems he's also clammed up on the issue of keys, and his further posts are talking about playback not working successfully from HD.

[dialysis1]

I believe he was referring to this article:
http://www.cdrinfo.com/Sections/News/Details.aspx?NewsId=19400

[xyz987]

This hardly seems confirmation to me. The "progress" screenshot posted shortly thereafter by w1retap shows BackupHDDVD running without the keys. Seems he's also clammed up on the issue of keys, and his further posts are talking about playback not working successfully from HD.

No, BackupHDDVD is supposedly running with a Title Key. See last line of command output.

[zacoz]

@dialysis1
I don't see how he was refering to that news article when his question clearly included a completely different link. But it doesn't really matter.

@xyz987
Ah yes, misread that bottom line. Must be too tired.

[dialysis1]

I was referring to the post that he read the article on Cdrinfo.
http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?p=926664#post926664

[Doom9]

At least, somebody actually went through the specs instead of just to speculate. I'm really puzzled how many people can have an opinion without so much as to bother to read the specs.
I've gone through parts of the AACS specs myself (cryptography.. ugh, nasty memories from boring and incomprehensible lectures at college re-awaken.. it's safe to say I wasn't an A student in that particular subject but I managed to pass the class regardless).. feizex is looking at the proper document.
But with regards to how to decrypt a movie, all that matters is section 3.5.
It involves 5 steps:
1) Decrypt the title keys:
Kt = AES-128D(Ku, Kte) where Kte is/are the encrypted title key(s) which can be read from the disc. Ku is a volume unique key.. BackupHDDVD can either start off with Kt or Ku, and AES-128D is publicly known.
2) Verify that content isn't revoked
Licensed players have to do that.. BackupHDDVD doesn't.
3) Verify the content signature
Once again, BackupHDDVD doesn't have to even do that.
4) Decrypt the content.
C = AES-128CBCD(Kt, Ce)
Where Ce is the encrypted content we can read off the disk, and we already have Kt from step 1. So bottom line, if you have Kt or Ku, all that remains to be done is implement the proper cryptographic functions and you can read the content. AES-128CBCD is a known function as well.

As far as player / drive revocation goes, that part appears to be in Chapters 3 & 4 of the common AACS specs but I haven't managed to properly digest that information yet.

If you find a flaw in the above reasoning (backed up with the appropriate references to the specs.. "I think" or "I believe" don't count.. this is simply mathematics we're talking about here and that's an exact science).


Also, while I'm at it I'd like to re-iterate that this isn't a crack and look at the CSS history again and see if any parallels can be drawn. BackupHDDVD simply implements the AACS decryption functions. You can't put in any disc and let it rip.. you need to know the decryption key. Consider a safe in a bank. You may be able to drag out the safe, you may even get the plans of how the safe is built, but that still doesn't allow you to get the money. In order to get the money, you either have to break the lock (that's the equivalent of hacking), or get the key. BackupHDDVD goes the latter way.
Now consider DeCSS. It didn't crack CSS either. But the Xing software DVD player left its keys unprotected.. DeCSS and Dodsrip used that player's key. 4 months later, the first DVDs started appearing that could no longer be decrypted using the known key.. so Xing and DeCSS were stuck whereas the rest of the world had no problem playing those discs. Then came VobDec, and only then was CSS cracked.. VobDec, rather than relying on an exposed key, cracked the rather weak CSS decryption - it decrypted content without knowing any of the player keys by breaking the encryption. So, while the mainstream press likes to write that DVD Jon broke CSS encryption, that's actually not correct (plus the decryption routines were written by somebody else)... DeCSS was a key to the safe, not a way to break into the safe without a key.
BackupHDDVD cannot even be compared to DeCSS.. it has no keys, and it most certainly has no means of breaking through the encryption without having a valid key.

[Pomyk]

I don't think the title/media/volume keys are anywhere in the memory. The drive does the decrypting and it needs Device Keys to do it. So in my opinion the only options are to hack a drive to get the device keys or to break AES.

[maksa]

good analogy. From a little I know about encryption, to hack (break open safe) is close to impossible. It'd take indefinite time. This analogy with safe is good to understand the options.
What we have is the safe and the samll locked box with the key to the safe inside. To open safe we need to open box (there are samller boxes inisde that one - tittle key, player key atc.), but weaknes of all this protection scheme is that thay givew you both, the safe and the small box(es). What are we going to attack, of course small boxes...
I gues that is the whole point of this thread.

[Beastie Boy]

To use the same ananogy, would it be a good idea to start someone working on the safe whilst the small boxes are being worked on. I know that this encryption method is extremely robust, but would some sort of distributed computing project be of any use to try the brute force route?
Suppose it would take 100 years to process every possible combination, doesn't that mean it could take anywhere between 1 minute and 100 years to find the key. It's statistically just as likely to be the first one that you try as it is to be the last one. But I'm not sure who would / could set up such a project even if it was feasible.

Disclaimer: I confess to knowing nothing about encryption or distributed computing, so please feel free to flame me.

Cheers, Beastie.

[Doom9]

I don't think the title/media/volume keys are anywhere in the memory.Please quote the part of the AACS specification that makes you think that.
The drive does the decrypting and it needs Device Keys to do itUmm.. let's actually look at the specs (AACS_Spec_Common_0.91.pdf). On page 27 we have a diagram of the whole decryption process. Note that the right part of the image, or the "host" part is the PC. And now look where the device keys are... the drive doesn't decrypt, for the simple reason that if it did, all you'd have to do to capture the decrypted content in digital form is dump the I/O bus.

On cracking 128bit AES: http://www.avolio.com/columns/pkiq+a.html. Sure, 56bit DES can be brute forced by considerable effort, but you don't actually have to try 2^56 key combinations.. several key bits can be inferred, which reduce the effective keysize to something manageable for the most expensive supercomputers or a huge network of interconnected PCs (unfortunately I don't recall exactly how many bits don't need to be brute-forced anymore.. I guess those cryptography notes on the attic would come in handy about now). Or to put it bluntly: forgettaboutit. AES is considered secure - unless a manufacturer makes a mistake in implementing the (publicly known and heavily scrutinized by the cryptography community around the world) specs, there's just no way.

[Pomyk]

I didn't read that part of the specs ;)
In that case moderately skilled cracker should be able to find those keys.

[Shinigami-Sama]

On cracking 128bit AES: http://www.avolio.com/columns/pkiq+a.html. Sure, 56bit DES can be brute forced by considerable effort, but you don't actually have to try 2^56 key combinations.. several key bits can be inferred, which reduce the effective keysize to something manageable for the most expensive supercomputers or a huge network of interconnected PCs (unfortunately I don't recall exactly how many bits don't need to be brute-forced anymore.. I guess those cryptography notes on the attic would come in handy about now)

modified 'folding at home' mayhaps?

Anyways

just a thought, isn't it possible to to set a trap to copy the memory that a given proccess is using?
though I dont think thats possible under Vista so probly useless

I would think if you could just grab the active memory from the started decrypt you could feed some random values into the AES and search for 'similar' values

though crypto isn't my forte

[Doom9]

modified 'folding at home' mayhaps?What exactly is it about a safe encryption that you don't understand? An algorithm is considered safe if it has no attack vectors that compromise the key integrity, and if it takes forever to brute-force it. Without going too much into detail, you can search google for how long it took to break DES and how many possible combinations DES really offers with all the known attack vectors, then multiply that time by 2^(128-effective key bits of DES)... you'll see you'll be crunching numbers for a very long time after you've died. Go to the next university and ask a cryptography professor if you can't believe me. You just won't crack the AACS safe.
isn't it possible to to set a trap to copy the memory that a given proccess is using?Yes.. didn't you follow the thread?
Please everyone.. with all the sensationalist stuff out there, and foundationaless speculations and the hacker allegations, let's show them we're not about that at all. The specs are out there.. feel free to read them and if you can prove or disprove any of muslix64 statements with verifiable facts, you are most welcome.
But your two cents really are just idle talk if you've neither read the specs nor know the first thing about debugging and we do have a "no idle talk" rule.

[generalnewbie]

Stupid journalist and there crappy stories!

Read this "On Wednesday, Muslix64 posted BackupHDDVD, a tool for decrypting AACS protected movies, on a Doom 9 forum thread along with the volume and title keys needed to decrypt HD-DVD movies such as Full Metal Jacket and Van Helsing."

Source:
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1895,2078016,00.asp

This guy clearly is an idiot because no KEYS WERE RELEASED!!!!

[NghtShd]

At least, somebody actually went through the specs instead of just to speculate. I'm really puzzled how many people can have an opinion without so much as to bother to read the specs.


I read the specs (though not the whole thing and I didn't pore over it, I admit). I have an opinion. My opinion is that he's offered nothing that someone wanting to fraudulently make the same claim couldn't have done. Had he not provided the code or a video but simply popped up and and said, "Hey, I cracked the HD-DVD copy protection. Gotta go now. Bye" would you take him at his word?

I'm not calling it a fraud, mind you, I'm just saying there is nothing more than some anonymous person's word that he did this. What works against his credibility, in my opinion, is the claim that the key was in memory and easy to find. If it's so easy then I'm suspicious as to why it hasn't been verified. It also makes me a bit suspicious when someone goes to the trouble to make a video and write and distribute an app but is then unwilling to discuss anything and instead he takes an immediate "vacation".

It puzzles me (well, not really, but for rhetoric's sake lets pretend it does) that people accept this "hack" as a fact with no verification. It's and interesting claim, but until it can be verified (and I'll be happy if that happens) it that's all it is.

[Shinigami-Sama]

What exactly is it about a safe encryption that you don't understand? An algorithm is considered safe if it has no attack vectors that compromise the key integrity, and if it takes forever to brute-force it. Without going too much into detail, you can search google for how long it took to break DES and how many possible combinations DES really offers with all the known attack vectors, then multiply that time by 2^(128-effective key bits of DES)... you'll see you'll be crunching numbers for a very long time after you've died. Go to the next university and ask a cryptography professor if you can't believe me. You just won't crack the AACS safe.


I was referancing your earlier post...

On cracking 128bit AES: http://www.avolio.com/columns/pkiq+a.html. Sure, 56bit DES can be brute forced by considerable effort, but you don't actually have to try 2^56 key combinations.. several key bits can be inferred, which reduce the effective keysize to something manageable for the most expensive supercomputers or a huge network of interconnected PCs (unfortunately I don't recall exactly how many bits don't need to be brute-forced anymore.. I guess those cryptography notes on the attic would come in handy about now). Or to put it bluntly: forgettaboutit. AES is considered secure - unless a manufacturer makes a mistake in implementing the (publicly known and heavily scrutinized by the cryptography community around the world) specs, there's just no way.



Yes.. didn't you follow the thread?
Please everyone.. with all the sensationalist stuff out there, and foundationaless speculations and the hacker allegations, let's show them we're not about that at all. The specs are out there.. feel free to read them and if you can prove or disprove any of muslix64 statements with verifiable facts, you are most welcome.
But your two cents really are just idle talk if you've neither read the specs nor know the first thing about debugging and we do have a "no idle talk" rule.

I have followed the thread
from page one - I'm just trying to throw some ideas albeit they've been said before with an equal number of people saying its stupid and wont work to hunt memory, I used to think that write protect on floppies was stupid until I erased my resume by accident a few years ago

as for the idle talk comment I'm done anyways.

[Turtleggjp]

Building on Doom9's description of DVD rippers, I doubt very seriously that rippers for HD discs will ever get beyond the level that the original DeCSS was. In order to get a VobDec style ripper, AACS would have to be broken, which is probably never going to happen. Right now, we are 1 step behind DeCSS, since we have the means to use keys, but don't have any keys. Someday soon, we will probably have DeCSS style rippers for these discs, but they will probably not be hosted by this site, as they would probably be illegal. These rippers will also suffer the fate of the original DeCSS, because of the key revocation built into AACS. I'm sure that the process of ripping these discs will ultimately be confined to the darker corners of the Internet, so most of us will either be out of luck, or be forced to turn to the dark side. :scared: My hope is that discussion of the tools to work with this content once decrypted will still be allowed to continue on this forum...

Matt

[noclip]

I don't think the title/media/volume keys are anywhere in the memory. The drive does the decrypting and it needs Device Keys to do it. So in my opinion the only options are to hack a drive to get the device keys or to break AES.

The key will always have to be somewhere directly accessible to the CPU. It's just how computers work.

[KornX]

only for those of you thinking about brute force
think about Landauer's Principle...

Doom9 linked an article earlier in the thread about ALMOST the same...

for the curious ones:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_Principle


KornX

[Romario]

Well, soon or later (probably until middle 2007), AACS protection will be cracked completely, not just partially.

[tonyp12]

The youtube video have been removed on the request of Warner Brother.
The video did show the first number for the keys.
the second title did start with 16 and the other titles did start with 1
the last two titles did start with one and second number looked like 10-19 something.

That would help a little if you are doing memory dump to find
the titles keys.

Though v1.0 now uses volume keys.

[feizex]

Here's one for the rumour mill the guy that claims to have found keys said that he copied the encrypted data onto his drive and PowerDVD played it - after he had played a portion of the HDDVD he removed it and could view the encrypted copy. If that's right then powerdvd doesn't clear the keys from memory like it is supposed to. It also means that Muslix64's video clip could have been faked the same way.

http://www.hardforum.com/showthread.php?t=1137390

#53 12-28-2006, 11:09 PM w1retap
Yes, it played back without the HD-DVD in the drive, but it was only because I didn't know and left PowerDVD open, which still had the key stored in it for the session. Upon further review, if I close PowerDVD and try to play it back off the hard drive, it is just a black screen and gets no audio or scratched/bliping audio.

Later he claims to have located the keys...
#56 12-31-2006, 07:14 PM w1retap
bwhahaha.. found encryption keys, volume keys, and the MCM managed copy V-ISAN ID. Now I'm just working on hashing the whole HD-DVD.. its taking a while.. lol. After that, I'll try the ripping program for playback off the hard drive. Then, if that works, its off to HDbits.

He then proceeded to show a screenshot of hddvdbackup running and decrypting the feature title of HULK hddvd
After this someone asks him about the keys and he clammed up.

#73 01-03-2007, 11:10 AM figgie
w1retap have you or have you not gotten the Title keys (at least the one needed for this workaround)?

#74 01-03-2007, 12:31 PM w1retap
1) I'm not going to speak of title keys on a public forum.

And again no response...
#75 Yesterday, 01:17 PM tharagleb
w1retap: So were you successful playing back after using backuphddvd?

#76 Yesterday, 01:38 PM w1retap
I'm not discussing anything further than I have already said yet. Especially to someone who has just joined the forum as of today. I won't answer your PM's.. nothing. The only thing I will answer is for how you guys to get your Xbox360 HD-DVD drives working with your PC if you need help. I'm not going to break any rules on [H] by discussing piracy.

Either he was faking it, or he really did find the keys and much like Muslix64 decided to keep it to himself. What you need is someone that is not afraid of releasing the keys - some young teenager in russia or someone equally untouchable.

Oddly enough he claims later that the very HDDVD that he screensnapped himself trying to decrypt (HULK) would not work with PowerDVD - the original disk would not work (nothing to do with backup).
#90 Today, 09:43 AM w1retap
Ya.. I am using PowerDVD 7. PowerDVD 6.5 doesn't support all movie titles, but nor does 7. I recently had to take back The Hulk because it didn't work on either program at all.

There is no more confirmation here than what muslix64 has already produced.

[Turtleggjp]

For those of you waiting so patiently for proof that this does work, don't hold your breath. The only way to prove this works is for someone to produce a key so that we can all try it. However, no public forum in its right mind (especially this one) will let such a key stay in the open for very long. Personally, I see no reason why this shouldn't work. The algorithm in question is very simple to compute if you have the key.

[tjf]

The youtube video have been removed on the request of Warner Brother.


The video is still available here:

http://www.cdr.cz/a/20159

[OverlordQ]

w1retap didn't solve anything. If you read his posts he thought he could break the protection by sniffing his network. The dude is a moron.

[Doom9]

I'm not calling it a fraud, mind you, I'm just saying there is nothing more than some anonymous person's word that he did this. What works against his credibility, in my opinion, is the claim that the key was in memory and easy to find. If it's so easy then I'm suspicious as to why it hasn't been verified. It also makes me a bit suspicious when someone goes to the trouble to make a video and write and distribute an app but is then unwilling to discuss anything and instead he takes an immediate "vacation".

It puzzles me (well, not really, but for rhetoric's sake lets pretend it does) that people accept this "hack" as a fact with no verification. It's and interesting claim, but until it can be verified (and I'll be happy if that happens) it that's all it is.
That's the root of the problem isn't it.. people believe or don't believe without actually being qualified to judge. Are you an experienced cracker, do you have ample experience with a debugger to verify if the keys can be found in memory or not? Do you know how a PC works and where information is stored when a program is running? If not, how can you make any claims as to the validity or not of muslix' claims? I personally am not qualified.. so I cannot in good conscience judge and that would make my opinion just idle gossip, which is why I do not comment on that part.

For the rest of it.. the specs are out, everybody can verify for themselves if the software properly implements the decryption mechanism outlined in the AACS specs. If you are not willing to at least have a cursory glance at the code and specs, whether or not you believe the software works is just idle gossip again.

All the unfounded speculation here and on the web almost makes me sick. I see the most ridiculous things these days, speculation about the release date and upcoming CES, speculation whether muslix is trying to sabotage HD DVD or Blu-ray (you see the argument going both ways), speculation about the origin of the author's nickname, all kinds of things you'd expect from people who have too much time at their hands and still don't quite know what they're talking about.

And looking at what they tried with DVD Jon (just to re-iterate, he didn't crack CSS), and the US exporting the DMCA all over the world, can you blame people from being more cautious? You don't see viodentia sticking out his head either, or the guy who write the DVD-A decryption software.

@feizex: that's idle gossip again. Posting a key is actually not much of a problem.. it's not so much different from providing a CSS decryption software.. you could post CSS keys (DVD Decrypter can show them) as well, but there's little use since every decrypter can automatically get those keys.

Well, soon or later (probably until middle 2007), AACS protection will be cracked completely, not just partially.You are not going to learn anything before we ban you, are you? AACS was not cracked.

The youtube video have been removed on the request of Warner Brother.Just another fair use violation on the part of the studios.. length and quality make the copyright infringement claim ridiculous.

[feizex]

All I was suggesting was that if someone posted a working key then we could verify it is possible. (stating the obvious I know!)

If posting a key is "not much of a problem" then howcome noone has?

As for gossip, yeah I'll cop that. But not much else has materialised has it?

Sorry.

[guth]

Thank you Doom9 for the best post in this thread!

If posting a key is "not much of a problem" then howcome noone has?
Maybe because noone has any keys...?

[xous]

All I was suggesting was that if someone posted a working key then we could verify it is possible. (stating the obvious I know!)

If posting a key is "not much of a problem" then howcome noone has?

As for gossip, yeah I'll cop that. But not much else has materialised has it?

Sorry.


No one has posted a key because it is forbidden on most forums, it is unlikely that someone has found one, and everyone that claims to have found a key is concerned with legal issues.

--

IMHO, I don't think muslix64 has done anything except produce a horrible ( the decryptEVOBFile method is easily a candidate for thedailywtf.com's CodeSOD) partial implementation of a published standard.


Isn't the tool alone a violation of IP law?

To quote the AACS docs:


The use of this specification and access to the intellectual property and cryptographic materials required to
implement it will be the subject of a license. A license authority referred to as AACS LA LLC (hereafter
referred to as AACS LA) is responsible for establishing and administering the content protection system based
in part on this specification.

[qbyter]

Here's one for the rumour mill the guy that claims to have found keys said that he copied the encrypted data onto his drive and PowerDVD played it - after he had played a portion of the HDDVD he removed it and could view the encrypted copy. If that's right then powerdvd doesn't clear the keys from memory like it is supposed to. It also means that Muslix64's video clip could have been faked the same way.

I have just tried it and can NOT confirm this.

I´ve copied a HDDVD to disc (using the UDF2.5 drivers), opened the original HDDVD with Powerdvd 6.5 HD - played fine. I then switched to "Playback HDDVD from folder" and selected the copy - Powerdvd says "Error trying to play...".

[Lord_KiRon]

I think the best way it can be if someone PMed (anonymously , like by creating new account and using Tor) Doom9 with at least one working key.
Then he could verify if it woks or not and tell us - we all trust him after all :)

[br0kenpipe]

Mabye this thread might be of interest?
http://www.avsforum.com/avs-vb/showthread.php?t=774256

[hajj_3]

apparently on the disk there is a plaintext file with the info below, this is what it says on the avsforums link anyway:

[deleted pending ruling from Doom9]

[Luk@s]

lol the key to decrypt the movie as a plain-text file on the disc.... that would be the gag of the year...

[VistaVick]

Too good to be true.

Remember, the key though is to REGENERATE.

[tonyp12]

Come on now, someone must own a 360HDDVD player
and have easy access to HULK hddvd.
$20 at walmart or in 2 days from netflix (make sure to change to HD DVD version)

The file was probably included on the disc by mistake by
the mastering company.

So can someone test it and get back to us?

[calinb]

The file was probably included on the disc by mistake by
the mastering company.No--I suspect the keys are the encrypted title keys expected to be in the VTKF000.AACS file. It's all in the spec! If the VTKF000.AACS file contained title keys in the clear, it probably wouldn't play, but I've not studied the spec sufficiently to know for sure how a player would behave given such a mishap.

Edit: Hmm--seems they're talking about a text file in the root directory of the disc. That wouldn't be the VTKF000.AACS file and that is strange!

[zeroprobe]

them keys are not 16 bytes long?