AACS to counterattack with watermarks and encrypted keys

[vio_man]

The AACS Licensing Administrator introduced new concepts against piracy of high definition videos. During a conference in Berlin they explicitely aimed at Slysoft's AnyDVD HD software by implementing further protection of the keys in the yet to be finished version of the AACS copy protection.

The final AACS version will require a recognition of watermarks embedded to the video to prevent camrips. These watermarks have to be recognised by all AACS compliant readers and halt the playback. Furthermore an encryption of the so called "data keys" will be added. These keys differ between drives and discs meaning that volume keys, processing keys, or title keys that will be retrieved by hackers in the future, will not enable others to decrypt the movie because, data keys will be calculated differently between different drives.

The keys that are compromised by AnyDVD HD so far will be revoked within a few days meaning that players will require new keys that can be updated either online or by reading them from new discs.

http://www.cdfreaks.com/news/AACS-to-counterattack-with-watermarks-and-encrypted-keys.html

[Ajax_Undone]

The AACS Licensing Administrator introduced new concepts against piracy of high definition videos. During a conference in Berlin they explicitely aimed at Slysoft's AnyDVD HD software by implementing further protection of the keys in the yet to be finished version of the AACS copy protection.

The final AACS version will require a recognition of watermarks embedded to the video to prevent camrips. These watermarks have to be recognised by all AACS compliant readers and halt the playback. Furthermore an encryption of the so called "data keys" will be added. These keys differ between drives and discs meaning that volume keys, processing keys, or title keys that will be retrieved by hackers in the future, will not enable others to decrypt the movie because, data keys will be calculated differently between different drives.

The keys that are compromised by AnyDVD HD so far will be revoked within a few days meaning that players will require new keys that can be updated either online or by reading them from new discs.

http://www.cdfreaks.com/news/AACS-to-counterattack-with-watermarks-and-encrypted-keys.html


You know they waist so much money on stupid copy protection methods. I wonder if they really believe that they can stop anything at all...

Their budget:
#1 Copy Protection $60 Billion Dollars
#2 The Grade B hack who programs the method 1 Silver bullet... (Just to make sure hes dead)
#3 A brand new suit so I don't look as stupid as the hackers give me credit for $2,000 Bucks
#4 a moths supply of booze so I can forget about my life till the next hack breaks the crap protection... 40 Bucks

All this to stop a market of video pirates who cant tie there own shoes Priceless...

Somethings money wouldn't dare be traded for. For everything else theirs the MPAA/RIAA...


Its not that we hack to steal we hack to learn, and Every good wall is another barricade that must be dealt with accordingly... We purchase the content we own the content Period...

They would have use believe that if we break down the guards that they setup we endanger their content... Hell most of the video on the open stream is copied from DVD's I doubt that anybody who dose the Internet rips is going to give half of two turds about what they do with AACS...

BluRay + believes that they have us beat OK :rolleyes: Whatever they wish to think... Hell they have their entire setup run on a Java VM... GaDah.... It was a Java scripter who killed AACS to begin with... :stupid:

Even If you can't use someone else's keys you can use the ones you get yourself... by using the tools that Will be available when this new Copy Right Tech comes out...

Hacking is like fishing if you use the right bate you can catch the biggest fish in the sea...:devil:

[Galileo2000]

I could not find any other sources on the inet for the quote of the OP except for this particular link to cdfreaks site.

Which makes me think it might be a fake announcement.

[honai]

It's not fake. The "new concepts" have been announced at this conference:

http://www.dvdforum.org/promo-euroconf.htm

A number of European mainstream news sites are also reporting this.

[setarip_old]

Hi!

Curiously, perhaps, the latest "news" at the AACS' own website ( http://www.aacsla.com/home ) dates back to May 07, 2007...

[noclip]

The AACS Licensing Administrator introduced new concepts against piracy of high definition videos.

What piracy? I'd love to see their lawyers in a courtroom squirming as they explain how viewing a movie a person has purchased constitutes "piracy".

[evdberg]

Furthermore an encryption of the so called "data keys" will be added. These keys differ between drives and discs meaning that volume keys, processing keys, or title keys that will be retrieved by hackers in the future, will not enable others to decrypt the movie because, data keys will be calculated differently between different drives.

The keys that are compromised by AnyDVD HD so far will be revoked within a few days meaning that players will require new keys that can be updated either online or by reading them from new discs.


Since the data (audio/video) on the disks itself are the same, the only way they can use different keys per drive is that the drive itself is going to encrypt the data once more. So as long as we can directly read the data from the disk (using the current Xbox360 addon drive), the 'old' system of Volume Unique Keys and titlekeys will continue to work ... or am I wrong?

[gioowe]

Think so too. They can hardly encrypt each sold disc individually.

So maybe they introduce a new drive->player encryption scheme where each sector is encrypted by the drive and decrypted by the player/host. But then each sector must be marked as copyprotected/plain or UDF cannot recognize the disc and also a player cannot start decrypting because it doesn't find the key files. Or all discs become unrecognizable until a host application authenticates first and reads the disc. Which also doesn't work because the file system driver cannot "read" the disc and the host application cannot handle UDF on a low level basis.

Furthermore what about all sold players? They don't understand the new "format". And people don't buy new drives again.

I think they only encrypt VID by a second key and revoke the known host key.

[mommyman]

The final AACS version will require a recognition of watermarks embedded to the video to prevent camrips. These watermarks have to be recognised by all AACS compliant readers and halt the playback.

Suppose they were talking about watermarks embedded in AUDIO streams only...

[gioowe]

They talked about camrips, so VIDEO ...

Does watermarks even work with all that cinema background noise?

[mitsubishi]

Well it's been discussed here before (here (http://forum.doom9.org/showthread.php?t=127633)) and the specs seems to only include audio watermarks.

They do infact claim the watermark is so good that it survives even mic-recording.

This seems to differ from the report here though....

The form of audio watermarking from the previous discussion only tells a compatable device that there should be encryption on the disc. This bothers pirates not at all, since it only matters when burning onto a blu-ray to play on a hardware player, not when playing on a HTPC ignoring the watermark. You could even download a blu-ray rip, convert to HDDVD and play that on a HDDVD player.

[Revgen]

They do infact claim the watermark is so good that it survives even mic-recording.


We'll see what happens when I play it back with a tube amp. ;)

[lightshadow]

About the drive doing an extra encryption for later being decrypted byt he host.

Does the drive at all have that much processor power to be able to do any encryption?

And what about memory/buffer? It must be very limited in a drive, so the blocks of data that it can encrypt at one time must be very limited.

[Galileo2000]

First of all, this article is for real it seems.

Second, why for the love of God would I take the cam rip video into my (HD DVD/BD) AACS-enabled player?

My player is supposed to be High Definition, no?

Either me or AACS are missing something here.

[JeffAlso]

The AACSLA is just a racket preying on the gullability and paranoia of studio execs and lawyers. Their technologies will never work; If I have the means to decrypt the disc to play it, then I have the means to decrypt it. It's security by obscurity.

The people who work for the AACSLA know this, and they also know it doesn't matter that the technology will never work. What matters is that they can convince the content providers that it might work, and then charge them and the player manufactures up the ass for a promise that they know full well they'll never be able to keep.

Preventing camrips from being played from an HD-DVD player? Sounds like another multimillion dollar feature to me.

[ATARI Vampire]

The people who work for the AACSLA know this, and they also know it doesn't matter that the technology will never work. What matters is that they can convince the content providers that it might work, and then charge them and the player manufactures up the ass for a promise that they know full well they'll never be able to keep.

Over the past few months the AACSLA has suffered a series of insurmountable physical and moral defeats. The truth is that AACS cannot win. As JeffAlso mentioned, the technology of obfuscation is inherently flawed.

Not to be harsh, but the AACSLA really caters to the fears of technology-ignorant corporations. I think the problem lies in the paradoxical nature of the AACSLA's role in society. It feeds off of the fears of Studio revenue loss due to piracy. Therefore, its role in life is to create perceptively solid solutions that can hopefully delay hackers just enough while the financial ends justify the impossible means. It's one of the subtle ironies in life that AACS was never intended to fully protect content. :rolleyes:

IMHO the AACSLA could save a lot of money by abandoning the idea of host-based encryption altogether.

[mommyman]

IMHO the AACSLA could save a lot of money by abandoning the idea of host-based encryption altogether.
And this is exactly that they do now:)

[linx05]

The AACSLA is just a racket preying on the gullability and paranoia of studio execs and lawyers. Their technologies will never work; If I have the means to decrypt the disc to play it, then I have the means to decrypt it. It's security by obscurity.

The people who work for the AACSLA know this, and they also know it doesn't matter that the technology will never work. What matters is that they can convince the content providers that it might work, and then charge them and the player manufactures up the ass for a promise that they know full well they'll never be able to keep.

Preventing camrips from being played from an HD-DVD player? Sounds like another multimillion dollar feature to me.One very good post! While I still try to wrap my head around AACS people on this board are *breaking* it left, right and center. Good on them for freeing up our rights.

[bourke]

Second, why for the love of God would I take the cam rip video into my (HD DVD/BD) AACS-enabled player?

Well I guess in the interim between AACS hacks I could use this to create copies of Blu-ray Discs:

My new toy :-) (http://quest4cameras.com/viewproduct.aspx?id=3587916)

Also, isn't the added encryption they are talking about just the bus encryption that we've all been expecting for quite some time now?

[vio_man]

From AACS LA

September 7, 2007 - AACS LA Announces Security Updates

Advanced Access Content System Licensing Administrator, LLC (“AACS LA”) announces that it has taken action to expire AACS encryption keys being used in an illegitimate product made by an unlicensed party to make unauthorized copies of HD DVD and Blu-ray movies. In accomplishing this expiration, AACS LA worked closely with the licensee which manufactured the player from which the AACS keys were extracted.

Consumers can easily continue to enjoy content that is protected by the AACS technology by downloading the latest version of their HD DVD and Blu-ray software players, thereby refreshing the encryption keys associated with those players. Consumers are advised to check with the manufacturer of their AACS-enabled Blu-ray or HD DVD PC-based player to make sure you have installed the latest version. The following manufacturer has provided a link to provide relevant information and facilitate consumer updating of their players:

CyberLink – publishers of PowerDVD products http://www.cyberlink.com/multi/patch/index.jsp



September 7, 2007 – AACS LA Announces Commencement of “Proactive Renewal”

AACS LA announces that it has started periodic “proactive renewals”, which, primarily for software player applications, provide for periodic renewal and refreshing of AACS encryption keys by licensed manufacturers and eventual expiration of old keys by AACS LA. This helps maintain the AACS technology as a vital means of distributing valuable high definition content to consumers. Consumers should expect that updates/patches will be periodically offered by their software manufacturer in order to ensure that the players continue to function as intended. The upgrading of software is a common practice in the software industry. Pursuant to the AACS technology licenses, manufacturers of software players are required to perform such updates in a consumer-friendly fashion.

http://www.aacsla.com/home

[arnezami]

Hello everyone,

Been very busy at XBH (http://www.xbox-scene.com/xbox1data/sep/EElZluZypZpmixPJrS.php) lately. :)

But seems like there are some developments regarding AACS. Looks like Sequence Keys and the introduction of bus encryption. In fact these are the two things the AACS LA simply did not have time for in the first release and now they are just "finishing it".

I guess I'm sort of back again. ;)

arnezami

[Inventive Software]

Can ya break the bus encryption too arnezami? ;)

In a way, I sort-of hope the AACS LA learn their lesson that they can't win with revoking these keys, no matter how often they revoke them. If they revoke them on a weekly basis, or even a monthly basis, customers will revolt because they don't want the hassle.

I also hope they learn the lesson with the bus encryption, and don't use these keys that people can so easily identify! :D

Why do I hope that? New methods of encryption are intriguing to look at and explore. The "keys" method seems to involve a lot of data transfer with keys back and forth between device and host and disc etc. But there were a lot of them, so identifying them was quite tricky at first. ;)

[greath]

Welcome back, arnezami. Hopefully, with new and exciting challenges ahead, we will be able to learn from your wisdom.

[lightshadow]

Been very busy at XBH (http://www.xbox-scene.com/xbox1data/sep/EElZluZypZpmixPJrS.php) lately. :)

Good to have you back =)

It sounds mighty interesting that the XBox360 uses a CPU key. Does there exist a schematic/block diagram of how the protection works in the 360? =)

[IanD]

From AACS LA:

Consumers can easily continue to enjoy content that is protected by the AACS technology by downloading the latest version of their HD DVD and Blu-ray software players, thereby refreshing the encryption keys associated with those players.
All well and good in theory, but PowerDVD 7.3.3104a breaks certain aspects of playback on my setup and only PowerDVD 7.3.2911 works properly. If I was required to use the latest version in order to refresh the encryption keys, then I wouldn't be able to play anything properly.

The comment from AACS LA presupposes Cyberlink will provide working player software with each forced encryption update and I'm not convinced that will happen.